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Abstract:  This paper argues that despite the internationalisation of economic activity, and a 
concomitant diminution of economic policy-making autonomy, national policy settings continue to 
display a surprising degree of divergence and remain important determinants of economic 
outcomes. Similarly,  there are distinctively different  and enduring patterns of corporate 
organisation  across nations which confer specific competitive advantages. Important theoretical 
and empirical questions are raised, therefore, about the potential efficacy of national economic 
policies and their capacity  to accommodate such divergent practices. This paper examines the 
bilateral relationship between Australia and Japan, and assesses the effectiveness of  Australia's 
predominantly neoliberal economic policy framework in the light of such national and 
organisational variation.  It will be suggested that  Australian policy-makers'  faith in market 
mechanisms caused  them to underestimate the significance of Japanese commercial practices and 
regional production strategies, rendering  attempts to transform the relationship  largely 
unsuccessful. 
 
For all the attention given to fashionable concepts like 'globalization', individual  
bilateral relations continue to be invoked as measures of the comparative efficacy 
of national economic policy settings. Caveats about the theoretical utility of 
national economies notwithstanding,1 there is still something to be said for this sort 
of analysis. At the very least, an examination of specific bilateral relations allows 
more detailed consideration to be given to the interaction between distinctive 
national economic patterns of organisation, and the sorts of policies that are 
designed to enhance or accommodate such variations.  
                                                 
∗ I would like to acknowledge the valuable suggestions made by Jane Hutchison and the anonymous referees 
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The potential significance of a bilateral perspective at both at the levels of  theory 
and political discourse is, of course,  most apparent  in the US-Japan relationship. 
This relationship  embodies the distinctly different styles of capitalist organisation  
that have attracted the attention of scholars (Thurow, 1992; Tyson, 1993) and, 
superficially at least,  appears to offer the possibility of empirically comparing 
alternative economic paradigms. However,  the US's unique, possibly 'hegemonic' 
role in the global political economy confers  power resources and economic 
leverage that are simply unavailable to other actors. Consequently, there is a 
constant temptation for the US to deviate from its own multilateral, market-
oriented rhetoric in pursuit of narrow national gains, making it less useful for the 
purposes of comparative analysis. 
 
Australia, by contrast,  while also having  Japan as its major economic partner, has 
adhered more strictly to the logic of market conforming, neoliberal economic 
policy settings.  Australia's bilateral relationship with Japan therefore provides a 
particularly useful empirical study with which to consider the  potential efficacy of 
a predominantly neoliberal policy framework when dealing with other nations, or 
more particularly, the transnational corporations (TNCs) that emanate from such 
countries. Of central interest here is whether the distinctive patterns of corporate 
organisation found in Japan place  trading partners at a competitive disadvantage. 
In a word, are the sorts of deregulatory policies promoted and adopted by 
countries like Australia likely to generate the sorts of unequivocal gains their 
advocates hope, or will they perpetuate a pattern of uncompetitiveness and 
structural dependency?  
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At the outset it is important to stress just how crucial the bilateral relationship with 
Japan is from an Australian perspective. Not only is Japan Australia's largest 
trading partner and an increasingly important source of capital investment, but 
Japanese companies are key players in shaping  emerging patterns of regional 
production. Without policies that are capable of accommodating the reality of 
Japanese corporate practices and organisational logic, the Australian government 
risks entrenching its somewhat marginal economic position within the region. 
Furthermore, a failure to recognise and take account of the organisational 
principles of Japanese corporate capital may mean that the trade and investment 
which does occur between the two countries may reinforce rather than alleviate 
Australia's dependent position. The relationship with Japan, then, represents an 
important test of Australian economic policy and a benchmark against which to 
measure recent attempts to transform Australia into a more competitive, 
technically sophisticated, and less resource-dependent economy. Moreover, this 
sort of case study contains potentially important insights into the more general 
interaction between market-oriented Anglo-American economies and those of East 
Asia. 
 
In the first part of this paper briefly I outline important assumptions of the 
neoliberal model and explain its attraction to policy makers in Australia since the 
1980s. Some of the more significant  initiatives taken by the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) during its thirteen year administration - like the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum and domestic reform - are detailed. Next, I consider the 
specific organisation of Japanese corporate capital and its subsequent impact on 
Australia. I illustrate how the structure of Japanese corporations has important 
trade implications that are generally not captured in the neoliberal framework 
which dominates Australia's external economic relations. Finally, I examine the 
4 
way Japanese corporations are integrated into the region of which Australia is a 
part. I suggest that Australia is unlikely to become part of increasingly important 
regional production networks and may  remain relatively marginalised from the 
dynamic economies to its north. 
 
 
1 Neoliberalism in Australia 
 
 While there may be fundamental structural differences in the way capitalism is 
organised across nations, governments still have a potentially important role to 
play in enhancing specific forms of competitive advantage and determining the 
manner in which nationally-based economic entities are integrated with the global 
economy. It is not so much a case of whether  states chooses to intervene in 
determining the operational environment of national economic structures, but of 
how   they do (Dunning, 1992). The overall mode of governance remains a crucial 
determinant of the relative attractiveness of individual nations to increasingly 
mobile international capital. What is particularly noteworthy in the Australian 
case, however, is the enthusiasm with which the ALP leadership has embraced  
neoliberal ideas as the theoretical and operational basis for its attempts to reorient 
and revivify national economic activity. 
 
Many of the factors that encouraged the adoption of neoliberal policies in Australia 
were ubiquitous. Central here, of course, was the increasing mobility of capital and 
the international integration of financial markets (Webb, 1991). While the extent of 
transnational capital flows may have circumscribed national economic policy 
autonomy, it did not render it redundant. Even within the structure of national 
capital markets, important differences remain between Japan  and the US, for 
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example, differences which are reflected and reinforced by the activities of their 
national banking sectors and their relationship with government (Pauly, 1994). Yet 
Australia is again distinguished by the speed with which a newly-elected Labor 
government moved in 1983 to deregulate the financial sector and 'float' the dollar. 
While there were clearly important international ideational currents sweeping 
through the Anglo-American economies which encouraged the emergence of what 
Cerny (1993:67) calls an 'embedded financial  orthodoxy', not the least of which 
were the apparent limitations of Keynesian demand management and the 
increasing fiscal burden imposed by welfare states, a shift to wholesale 
deregulation was not the only possible policy response. The Japanese government, 
for example, patently took a very different view about the desirability and 
necessity of both a diminished government role and widespread financial 
deregulation (Sheridan, 1993: chapter 9). 
 
The Importance of Contingency 
 
To explain the early adoption of neoliberal policies in Australia, and the 
subsequent direction of policy,  it is necessary to briefly say something about 
contingent national circumstance. Several  inter-related factors are of particular 
importance here. Firstly, the Labor government that oversaw the deregulation of 
the Australian economy from the early 1980s was at pains to demonstrate its 
competence in the area of economic management. The dismissal of the previous 
Labor administration under Gough Whitlam in 1975  and the reputation for 
economic incompetence that this bequeathed  Labor are central parts of any 
explanation of Labor's subsequent embrace of neoliberalism. Secondly, the new 
Labor administration led by Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Treasurer Paul 
Keating took an infinitely more pragmatic view of the business of government than 
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did their predecessors. 'Sound', market-sanctioned, economic management was the 
hallmark of the new Labor administration. This tendency was enthusiastically 
supported by key elements of the public service, which provided influential, 
neoclassically-oriented  economic advice to the inexperienced new Treasurer 
(Kelly, 1992). Finally, a growing perception existed in Australia that it was being 
left behind by the emergent regional economies and increasingly marginalised in 
an expanding global trading system.2 This mounting sense of crisis provided a 
critical catalyst for a radical shift in policy-orientation. 
 
Indeed, the rise of neoliberal ideas in Australia cannot be understood without 
reference to the influence of a coterie of academic economists, advisers and 
commentators that have systematically promoted market-oriented policies as the 
answer to the perceived problem of national economic decline. Certainly, such 
ideas may have been gaining ground within  Anglo-American political elites since 
the 1970s, but in  Australia a distinctive 'epistemic community' coalesced around 
such ideas and actively promoted them to policy makers, something that helps 
explain both the speed with which they were adopted and the extent with which 
they were applied (Higgott, 1992). It is possible to identify key individuals that 
have exerted a powerful influence on the course and content of Australia's 
economic policies. Ross Garnaut (1990), for example, was at one time Bob Hawke's 
principal economic adviser, and subsequently authored an extremely influential 
report that formed  the basis for subsequent policy toward East Asia. Importantly, 
Garnaut not only suggested that Australia would be best served by allowing 
market forces to determine economic outcomes, but also argued that this had been 
the cause of the region's rapid economic development. Such an analysis, however,  
fails to take account of an impressive body of evidence that suggests that state 
intervention has  played a significant role in the development of many, if not all the 
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nations of East Asia (Appelbaum & Henderson, 1992). It is precisely the specificity 
of the historical trajectories of many Asian economies, in particular  their integral 
and distinctive corporate relations that is neither addressed nor appreciated by 
Australia's dominant policy approach. 
 
And yet, paradoxically enough,  it is  the same sort of market-oriented vision that 
is so central to Australian political discourse that is currently exerting a wider, 
regional ideational influence. APEC, and its deregulatory, free-trade agenda has 
rapidly become an important piece of regional political architecture (Beeson, 
1995a). Although it is not possible here  to fully consider the implications of APEC 
on regional economic policies,  a couple of points can be briefly made: Firstly, 
while the establishment of APEC may be seen as a triumph of Australian 
diplomacy, this does not mean that its liberalisation timetable will be implemented 
or adhered to, especially within its increasingly ambitious-looking time frame.3 
Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, market-conforming 
initiatives of the sort proposed by APEC officials are unlikely to address the 
fundamental causes of trade friction between members, nor bring about a 
transformation in the position of countries like Australia and the US. Much of the 
competitive advantage enjoyed by countries like Japan springs from the manner in 
which individual capitalist enterprises are organised within that country. 
Furthermore, even though established patterns of economic activities in the region 
are being transformed in the wake of the restructuring of Japanese productive 
activities, this is no guarantee that  Australia will benefit. 
 
The success of Australian policy seems even less assured when  Japan’s APEC 
strategy is considered. Somewhat surprisingly, Japanese economists  have been at 
the forefront of promoting a Pacific free trade area since the 1960s (Korhonen 1994). 
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Unlike their Australian counterparts, however, they have exerted little influence 
over the policy making process in Japan.  Genuine trade liberalisation might have 
threatened the Japan’s mercantilist trade and industry strategies and the 
constellations of political and business forces that supported them (Nester 1991). 
Japanese policy makers only became seriously interested in institutionalising a 
trade liberalisation mechanism in the Asia Pacific when access to critically 
important markets  was jeopardised by a rising tide of protectionism in the United 
States. Ironically, the Japanese encouraged Australia to promote APEC’s 
development because of residual regional suspicion of Japan  and its war-time role 
(Funabashi 1995). It is important to recognise that Japan’s attitude  to trade 
liberalisation remains highly ambivalent: domestic politics, especially the power of 
the agriculture lobby, make it extremely difficult for Japanese governments to 
pursue liberalisation seriously - a situation the recent elections have done little to 
change.4 
 
Before considering the crucially important regional organisation of productive 
activities in any detail, it is also important to say something about another 
dimension of Australia's market-oriented restructuring: domestic reform. 
Australian policy-makers attempts to make market mechanisms the central 
organising principal of economic life have not been confined to international fora. 
Simultaneously, Labor has attempted to place competitive market pressures at the 
heart of national economic organisation.5 Again key advisers and reports to 
government have been central in defining the course of national economic reform.  
 
The Hilmer (1993) report effectively did for the domestic economy what Garnaut 
had attempted to do for Australia's external relations: establish an agenda of 
reform with market mechanisms at its centre. Privatisation policies are the 
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predictable centrepiece of envisaged domestic reforms, along with a more 
generalised policy of micro-economic reform, particularly in the labour market 
through the development of a more 'flexible' workforce. While the privatisation 
agenda might be criticised for failing  to acknowledge the importance of the public 
sector in Australia's social and economic infrastructure development, a more 
substantial critique can be made of Hilmer-style innovations: even if such reforms 
are implemented they are unlikely to transform Australia's marginal and 
dependent relationship with the countries to its north. The sort of 'efficiency' gains 
promised by Hilmer are unlikely to make Australia a more attractive investment 
proposition in the eyes of potential investors like the Japanese: in the more 
valuable areas of high skill manufacturing, labour costs are not central 
determinants of investment locations. In less valuable forms of production, 
Australian workers cannot hope to compete with wage levels in Indonesia or the 
Philippines by increases in productivity and the like.  
 
To understand the role Australia plays in the calculations of Japanese investors, 
and why internal initiatives like labour market reform are unlikely to transform its 
position, it is necessary to take a closer look at Japanese activities in the region.  
Only a regional perspective can explain the position of individual nations in 
increasingly integrated transnational production networks. 
 
2. Neoclassical Assumptions and Japanese Corporate Organization 
 
The organisation of the firm, and the overarching corporate structures within 
which it is embedded is one  the most  noteworthy and distinctive qualities of the 
Japanese political economy. What is equally striking, however, is how little such 
differences are factored in to either theoretical analysis or pragmatic policy-making 
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in Australia. This failure to acknowledge the specificity of Japanese organisational 
and commercial practices leaves Australian policy-makers poorly-equipped to 
comprehend or react to the activities of Japanese multinationals in Australia itself, 
or in the wider region. Much of this lack of theoretical sophistication can be 
attributed to the continuing dominance in Australia of a  body of thought that 
draws its principal inspiration from neoclassical economics. It is important, 
therefore, to say something about the  assumptions this model makes about the 
organisation of economic activity in general and those of the firm in particular. 
 
The theoretical implications of methodological individualism, which lie at the heart 
of the neoclassical approach, go some way to explaining not only a consequent 
focus on improving individual productivity in the labour force, but also the 
neoclassical model's depiction of the firm. Alfred Marshall's ideal-typical 
conception of the firm, for example, paralleled the neoclassical notion of the 
calculating, utility maximising household. Factors of production were assumed to 
be readily substitutable in a 'representative firm', which responded to 'natural' 
market pressures in a perfectly competitive environment (Hunt, 1979: 271-86). 
Market forces assured that equilibrium was maintained between supply and 
demand, and that no firm was able to assume a position of market dominance. In 
short, market mechanisms achieved  optimal economic outcomes and allocation of 
resources. Clearly, there is an important normative, not to say ideological  sub-text 
here. What is important in the context of this discussion however, is that this sort 
of ahistorical idealisation continues to underpin mainstream economic theory in 
Australia, and exerts an important influence in determining the shape of what Hall 
(1993:279) calls a 'policy paradigm', or the 'framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used 
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to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing'. 
 
In Australia, the market-conforming neoclassical model has been especially 
influential, especially in the area of external economic relations. But what the 
neoclassical tradition - which provides the theoretical backdrop for the more 
general neoliberal paradigm - most conspicuously fails to acknowledge is the 
importance of historical contingency. Rather than the sort of uniform abstractions 
posited by the neoclassical model, an examination of the historical evolution of 
corporate organisations generally, but particularly within nations, reveals 
important differences in the evolution of  firms.  Lazonick (1993: chapter 1)  
distinguishes between three major historical forms of capitalist corporate 
development: the era of market coordination (entrepreneurial capitalism 
epitomised by nineteenth century laissez faire Britain); managerial capitalism 
(developed in the US and predicated upon greater organisational coordination and 
the more effective utilisation of productive resources); collective capitalism 
(planned coordination  extended horizontally across groups of legally distinct 
firms, and vertically to include the shop floor).  The point to emphasise here is that 
in neoclassical analysis significant  national differences, which help determine the 
structure of individual  economies and their subsequent inter-national articulation  
are submerged in the pursuit of theoretical elegance and parsimony. To appreciate 
the importance of this omission, it is important to detail more fully the 
organisation of Japanese corporate capital. 
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Collective Capitalism 
 
Historical experience appears to refute many of the assumptions of the neoclassical 
model and the neoliberal policies that flow from it.  Japan is only the most striking 
example of a nation where the evolution of more extensive productive activities 
has conferred specific advantages of scale and scope on industry. In contradiction 
to the neo-classical ideal, oligopolisation has not necessarily been a source of 
'inefficiency',  but the potential basis of significant competitive advantage for 
individual enterprises and a pre-requisite for expansion (Chandler, 1990). In Japan 
these potential benefits were  recognised and institutionalised in ways that   
conferred enduring competitive advantages on Japanese corporations. 
 
Of particular significance here, are the co-operative relationships that developed 
between private corporations and the state. Ironically, US efforts after World War 
II  to break up the zaibatsu,  or the privately-owned industrial empires that 
dominated the Japanese economy before the war, were instrumental in entrenching 
the influence and power of the bureaucracy and establishing the preconditions for 
the type of government-business cooperation that characterised Japan's high-
growth period (Johnson, 1987). Consequently, older zaibatsu  groupings like 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo, far from disappearing, became pillars of Japan's 
post-war political economy. The continued importance of the huge Japanese 
industrial groups in the post-war is easily demonstrated: although there were over 
1.5 million corporate enterprises registered in 1982, only 2,455 were classified as 
'big businesses' (over ¥1 billion capitalisation), while 'very big business' (over ¥10 
billion capitalisation) represented a mere 322 firms (Sumiya, 1989:105). In addition 
to Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo, the Fuyo, Dai-Ichi Kangyo and Sanwa 
Groups make up the 'big six' industrial groups that dominate Japan's economy. 
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In the post-war period Japanese corporate groups have been generally subsumed 
under the rubric  keiretsu  which, Gerlach (1992a:82) argues, are best seen 
 
 not as a particular pattern among specific sets of firms but as an overall process  in which 
arms'- length markets are replaced by intercorporate cooperation of varying degrees of 
intensity: by long-term relationships among legally independent enterprises; the linkage of 
business ties across multiple market sectors (most commonly, although not exclusively. with 
equity ownership); and the setting of these relationships in a symbolic framework and in the 
context of broader networks each partner has with other firms. [Emphasis in original.] 
 
It is  important to recognise that relationships between firms in Japan simply do 
not follow the idealised pattern of arms-length relationships between distinct and 
inherently competitive enterprises that orthodox theory suggests. Rather, keiretsu  
networks are intercorporate alliances that represent  preferential trading 
relationships which have generally endured for decades. These mutually beneficial 
alliances are reinforced by the structure of keiretsu  networks. Individual industrial 
groupings may have varying degrees of horizontally or vertically integrated 
operations, and greater or lesser degrees of hierarchical control. Horizontal keiretsu  
involve an affiliation of firms over a wide range of industries, such as  Mitsubishi,  
within which the overall group of companies  includes banking, heavy industries, 
brewing, chemicals, engineering, paper, food, petroleum, electronics, mining, 
textiles, shipping, and cars. Vertical keiretsu  have a  more tightly defined 
production focus and rationale, and consist of one or more large industrial 
conglomerates and their subsidiaries, plus allied companies, major customers and 
subcontractors - Toyota, for example. But even Toyota, although largely 
independent, is also a member of the wider Tokai Group, which includes a range 
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of companies involved in  diverse activities from finance to construction and 
retailing. 
 
Generally, a keiretsu  grouping  consists of a main bank, a trading company (sogo 
shosha), and various manufacturing companies.  Loyalty, identity and corporate 
cohesion are reinforced by participation in  presidents' councils, in which the 
leaders of the various divisions meet to discuss group policy. Group companies 
have cross-holdings of infrequently traded shares in fellow keiretsu  members 
which reinforce company loyalty and dependency, while simultaneously 
insulating individual companies from hostile takeovers - allowing Japanese 
companies to privilege market share over short-term profitability. Alliance 
patterns based on cross equity holdings are characteristic of Japan's industrial 
organisation in general, and not confined to more formal inter-market groupings 
(Gerlach, 1992b:18). The  structure of Japanese capitalism predisposes companies to 
inter-act in particular ways and to cooperate over time for reasons that are not 
apparent in orthodox analyses that simply focus on  profitability and commercial 
gain. This is not to suggest that group members do not trade with outside 
companies. Rather, it is to suggest  that, ceteris paribus,  members of Japanese 
industrial groups will favour other members where possible, particularly where 
this does not interfere with commercial considerations. Japanese commercial 
relationships are not driven simply by  market pressures - fostering long-term, 
mutually beneficial relationships may be more important  than achieving  short-
term financial gain.  
 
Keiretsu  networks, then,  predispose Japanese companies toward long-term 
preferential business relationships that are not simply predicated upon short-term 
commercial benefit. However, the maintenance of these relationships would be 
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more problematic were it not for the activities of another distinctive feature of 
corporate Japan, the general trading companies or sogo shosha. The sogo shosha  
merit especial consideration not only because they illustrate the shortcomings of 
the neo-classical conception of the firm, but because they are often the principal 
instrument through which Japan's economic relations are mediated, and the initial 
point of contact with which trading partners must deal.  
 
The trading companies emerged largely as a result of Japan's resource dependence. 
The process of national industrialisation inaugurated in the early Meiji period 
meant that Japan was necessarily forced into greater trade with the rest of the 
world. The trading companies rapidly expanded and took over the organisation of 
Japan's export and imports, allowing them to play an important role in facilitating - 
even leading -  national industrialisation and economic development. Their role 
and operations have subsequently expanded but they continue  to perform three 
primary functions: transaction intermediation; financial intermediation (quasi-
banking); and information gathering (Kojima & Ozawa, 1984:16). Even though 
some Japanese manufacturers have established independent distribution networks, 
the sogo shosha  continue to play a crucial role in  securing the resource supplies 
upon which Japan's expanded manufacturing capacity depended. Less apparent, 
but equally significant,  is the trading companies' role as a financial intermediary 
where they perform important credit provision and   risk-sharing functions. In 
effect the trading companies act as 'quasi-banks and quasi-insurance agencies', 
providing important potential competitive advantages for clients (Sheard, 1992). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the sogo shosha  provide an unparallel 
information gathering and dissemination service for themselves and their clients. 
These  structural characteristics not only influence corporate behaviour amongst 
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Japanese firms, they also have important implications for trading partners like 
Australia. 
 
 
The Impact of Japanese Corporate Structures on Australia 
 
The advantages conferred on Japanese corporations by their distinctive  
organisational patterns are not solely internal to the firm. On the contrary, the 
keiretsu  structure provides specific benefits when dealing with foreign 
competitors, both in Japan and overseas. This is nowhere more apparent than in 
Japanese corporate relations with Australia. A couple of examples will illustrate 
their potential importance. 
 
Despite the best intentions of government in Australia to transform the structure of 
the domestic economy and encourage the export of high value-added goods, 
Australian exports remain dominated by commodities. Of these, coal remains 
Australia's largest single visible export, representing about $A 8 billion in sales and 
more than 12% of total merchandise exports. Japan is Australia's principal 
customer and therefore a critical influence on coal prices. This would be the case 
even in a situation where market forces were the primary determinants of value. 
However,  what an examination of the Australia-Japan trading relationship reveals 
is that market forces have very little to do with the setting of coal prices; something 
of even greater significance given that the negotiations between Australia and 
Japan effectively set the benchmark for world coal prices. 
 
The crucial role played by the sogo shosha  in the coal trade is not simply motivated 
by or a response to market forces. The trading houses have played an important  
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role in facilitating the state-guided growth and international expansion of Japanese 
industry. Moreover, they have been an important extension of Japan's overall  
economic policies, especially in furthering Japan's resource security policy. This 
has meant that the activities of the sogo shosha  in Australia have not been driven by 
commercial considerations alone. Indeed, the sogo shosha  have been prepared to 
sacrifice short-term (or any) profit  on their comparatively small investments in 
coal mines in Australia  to cement strategically important long term trading 
relationships, and  ensure continuing control of high volume trade for a major 
client; it is the relationship with the Japanese buyer that is the real source of 
profitability for the sogo shosha  (Beeson, 1995b).  
 
These minimally profitable investments take on additional  significance in the 
context of the coal industry in Australia. The sogo shosha's  principal profits in the 
coal industry are derived from commissions on coal sales, often from both buyers 
and sellers.  From the sogo shosha's  perspective, ensuring control of the high 
volume trade is of greater importance  than securing a profit from a small stake in 
an Australian mine. The trading houses' strategic investments in  Australian mines 
are important for two reasons: they provide valuable information about  possible 
conditions amongst Australian producers which may be used in price negotiations;  
they permit a  systematically induced over-supply that may depress coal prices, 
something  from which the trading houses' most important clients will benefit 
(McIntosh Baring,1993:45). In the coal industry, where the trading companies' 
major profits are derived from their role as high-volume suppliers to Japanese steel 
mills and electricity utilities, securing these lucrative relationships - which in the 
case of the mills may be reinforced through keiretsu  ties - is obviously of critical 
importance. Small investments in new mines may be a relatively cheap and 
effective manner in which to ensure this outcome.  
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Table 1 
                   Australia's Commodity Trade with Japan ($A millions) 
     
                    1983/4                 1993/4 
 Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Food and Live Animals 1156 36 3002 38 
     
Beverages and Tobacco 1.7 0.6 43 25 
     
Crude Materials  Except 1997 34 3245 59 
    Fuels     
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants 2074 3 4874 12 
   and Related Materials     
Animal and Vegetable Oils, 6.5 0.6 13                    - 
   Fats and Waxes     
Chemical and Related 27 217 123 445 
   Products     
Manufactured Goods 127 866 1215 1196 
     
Machinery and Transport 36 3672 521 9133 
   Equipment     
Miscellaneous Manufactured  17 415 103 829 
   Articles     
Others 1083 90 2726 136 
     
Total Trade 6527 5337 15865 11873 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogue Nos 5422.0 & 5410.0  
 
While such investments are obviously not enough to guarantee control of the 
industry or even individual companies, it is important to recognise that the ability 
of Japanese companies to dominate the Australian coal trade is not dependent on 
ownership levels alone. What Australian policy-makers and orthodox economic 
commentators generally fail to recognise is that there is a commonality of interest 
between the  trading companies  and the major commercial consumers in Japan - 
encouraged and assisted by the Japanese government -  which gives Japanese 
investors in Australia a greater collective influence than their individual stakes 
would suggest. Moreover, this Japanese unity is in marked contrast to and actively 
encourages  fragmentation and competition on the Australian side.  
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Not only do the sogo shosha  take a long-term view of their trading relations, but the 
conception of the 'national interest' is not simply political rhetoric. Price is not the 
sole criterion by which decisions to purchase are made. Japanese resource buyers 
have been keen to ensure a diversity of supply, which not only increases supply 
security, but  as Koerner (1993) suggests,  allows buyers to  minimise coal prices by 
playing off one supplier nation against another, to a point where Australian import 
volumes to Japan have declined as a matter of policy,  despite being the lowest cost 
supplier. Contrary to what orthodox economics might predict, price has not been 
the sole or even the most important influence on buyer preferences. On the 
contrary, Japanese buying practices have been informed by a long-term 
perspective in which  the sogo shosha  have played an important foreign policy role, 
mediating Japan's national resource security policies (Shao & Herbig, 1993:42). In 
such a context, no amount of productivity increases or more cooperative 
workplace relations could be expected to improve Australia's market share or mine 
profitability.  
 
The coal industry in not the only sector to be disadvantaged by Japan's corporate 
structures. Even where highly competitive export products have been developed in 
Australia,  'invisible' trade barriers mean that it has been virtually impossible for 
them to penetrate the Japanese market. Over the last ten to fifteen years a new 
generation of aluminium-based, ship builders has emerged in Australia, 
specialising in the highly competitive passenger ferry and luxury pleasure craft 
markets. Although these Australian-based exporters are generally considered to be 
amongst the best in the world in terms of price and quality, they have been notably 
unsuccessful in winning export orders from Japan, despite achieving numerous 
sales in China, Hong Kong, and  European nations with  rival industries. 
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Even though there are more than 2,000 ferries operating in the Japanese 
archipelago, and that in any given year up to 10%  will need replacing with 
precisely the sorts of boats that are manufactured in Australia, only three sales 
have been achieved, compared to thirty in China in the last five years (ASM 1995: 
8). Senior executives in key Australian boat builders attribute this to the structure 
of Japanese industry.6 Once again, price is of less significance than loyalty to fellow 
group members involved in the manufacture of rival boats in Japan (Beeson, 
1995c). Indeed, there is some suspicion that the only ferry sale achieved thus far 
was for 'tokenistic' reasons, and needs to be seen in the wider context of trade 
disputes with the US. Even if such observations are dismissed as self-serving, it is 
clear that Japan's import pattern  remains 'startlingly different', in that it has not 
followed the trend evident in other nations and increased intra-industry trade; in 
fact, argues Lincoln (1990:48), it is actually lower now than in 1970.  Even where 
intra-industry trade does occur it  is at the low-value end of production; a corollary 
of this is that in those sectors of the economy where Japanese exports are highest, 
imports are lowest.  
  
The point to emphasise here is that Japanese corporate organisation represents a 
structural barrier that effectively reduces the level of imports into Japan. This is 
particularly so where keiretsu members are themselves actively involved in a 
particular industry, and where that industry is vertically organised ( Lawrence 
1993). Similarly, government agencies have presented additional obstacles to 
imports  through complex regulatory standards and preferential government 
purchasing arrangements, especially in the area of manufactured goods (Lutz 
1992). 
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Clearly, then, there are substantial grounds for questioning the efficacy of a policy 
paradigm that places great reliance on market forces when these are neither the 
sole, nor in many cases the primary determinant of economic practices. As Table 1 
indicates, although exports of manufactured goods from Australia have increased, 
it has been from a low base, and is, in any case, dwarfed by the growth of 
manufactured imports from Japan. Australian exports remain predominantly 
unsophisticated raw materials. It might be objected that as Australia is one of the 
few countries to enjoy a trade surplus with Japan, it has little to worry about.7 
However, there are still significant grounds  for concern. Most importantly, 
Australia is losing its share of Japan’s market.  Australian producers’ reliance on 
the sogo shosha to manage their export trade  frustrates attempts by Australian 
companies to broaden their export profile (Hartcher 1994). Japan’s historical 
restructuring away from  energy and resource intensive industries may have made 
a decline inevitable, but Australia has been unable to transform its position, partly 
because of its structural dependency on Japanese intermediaries. 
 
An examination of specific industries reveals, then, that Australia’s position in 
relation to Japan is not solely due to the influence of market forces or comparative 
advantage. Yet such specificity  is only part of the picture neglected by the 
neoclassically-inspired, neoliberal economic policy framework. Of equal 
significance in comprehending the behaviour of corporate capital in general and 
Japanese organisational logic in particular, is the wider regional framework within 
which such relationships are embedded. 
 
 
3. Australia, Japan, and Regional Integration 
 
22 
The region of which Australia and Japan are a part has become the focus of 
increasing scholarly interest and political activity. Although the defining 'the 
region' is a somewhat arbitrary process (Cumings, 1993), for the purposes of this 
paper it will be taken to include (in addition to Australia and Japan) the nations of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the newly industrialised 
economies (NIEs) of Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as China. 
The significance of the region here is that it forms the  crucially important 
backdrop against which Australia's bilateral relationship with Japan is played out. 
Potential investors and economic partners in Japan do not simply react to 
initiatives within Australia, but consider Australia as one possible investment 
location  amongst many in an evolving mosaic of regional opportunities. 
Significantly, however, an examination of the historical trajectory of regional 
development and the dialectical interplay with  Japanese economic interests 
reveals that  established  patterns of interaction exist, reinforced by evolving 
production networks throughout the region, which predispose investment 
decisions toward particular areas for specific reasons. Simply establishing political 
mechanisms, like APEC, which are intended to liberalise trade and investment is 
unlikely to alter the entrenched patterns of regional economic activity. 
 
In this regard, it should be noted that Japan's much-discussed role in the East 
Asian region is hardly a new one. Extensive economic activity between Japan and 
the region were established before World War II, a factor  which influenced 
subsequent patterns of interaction (Petri, 1992). Indeed, Japanese colonialism in 
Taiwan and Korea was not only instrumental in accelerating economic 
development, but provided an important exemplar for two more regional states 
that have eschewed the nostrums of orthodox economics in their own economic 
development (Cumings, 1984). When Japan's economic relationship with the 
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region resumed it was similarly characterised by a reluctance to rely on market 
forces alone to determine its external policies. A perception of resource 
vulnerability led to active state involvement in securing adequate supplies through 
strategic investments throughout the region. Furthermore, as rising living 
standards made traditional Japanese industries like textiles less competitive, the  
government was actively involved in the re-structuring of  industry and the 
regional patterns of investment that emerged as a result (Okimoto, 1989:chapter 1). 
 
In such a context the  importance of Japanese capitalism’s distinctive 
organisational logic becomes more apparent. On the one hand  the ownership 
structure of keiretsu partners insulates Japanese companies from the sorts of short 
term shareholder pressures which affect their ‘stand alone’ western rivals, and 
which make corporate re-structuring inherently risky. A  close relationship with 
government ensures that Japanese companies’ reorganisation strategies will occur 
within a wider framework of government sponsored trade and aid packages that 
make relocation or restructuring  easier (Hatch & Yamamura 1996).  Finally, the 
complex structure of Japanese corporations, with their internal  industrial, financial 
and trading arms, means that they are uniquely capable of reproducing 
internationally the sorts of organisational structures that underpinned their 
domestic rise (Steven 1996). 
 
Yet despite the structural power of Japanese corporations, manufacturing 
investment is, of course, particularly welcomed by other national governments 
because of its job-creating potential and possibilities for technology transfer. Three 
broad phases of post-war Japanese regional trade and investment in 
manufacturing may be distinguished. In the immediate post-war period Japan had 
an intermediate role in a three-way trade relationship between the US and the 
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region, importing advanced industrial goods from the former and exporting 
simple manufactures to the latter. From approximately the mid 1960s to the mid 
'70s a combination of rising Japanese labour costs and regional protectionism saw 
the electronics and (especially) the textile industry move off-shore, in order to 
reduce production costs and protect markets. From the late 1970s Japanese 
industry was continually restructured in an effort to lower costs and raise 
productivity, frequently resulting in the export of low value-added forms of 
production while retaining high value-added in Japan and 'maintaining its 
economic dominance of the region' (Morris-Suzuki, 1991:149).  
 
Furthermore,  as Japanese multinationals are moving into the region they are 
'creating de facto  exclusive production networks, replicating keiretsu   and other 
domestic structures abroad' (Dobson, 1993:37).This enables Japanese 
multinationals to internalise transaction costs, opening up possibilities for transfer 
pricing,8 as well as reinforcing  control through a greater reliance on Japanese 
management. Significantly, Japanese multi-national trade within the region 
remains  predominantly inter- industry, rather than following the general 
international trend toward intra-industry trade. The manufactured exports to 
Japan that do occur  are often unfinished, intermediate goods.  A significant 
development in the region has been the entrenchment  of the triangular trade 
relationship between Japan, the US and the region as a whole. The  combination of 
foreign protection and the dramatic Yen appreciation during the 1980s in 
particular, not only caused Japanese industry to restructure and move elements of 
production offshore, but also altered the pattern of trade between the regions. 
While the NIE's exports gained an increasing share of the US market, Japanese 
capital goods exports to the NIEs also grew. Japanese multinationals are significant 
actors  in this three way trade, with affiliated production aimed at third countries, 
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circumventing protection barriers and taking advantage of lower labour costs 
(Park & Park, 1991).  
 
The point to emphasise here is that while there may be some degree of 
'convergence' in the way Japanese and Anglo-American TNCs conduct their 
operations, there are still important differences which may be entrenched in 
emerging tightly integrated, regional production networks. As Doherty (1994: 14) 
notes, the 'traditional' pattern of Japanese production  has not disappeared in Asia, 
but remains and is 'organised hierarchically to ensure that Tokyo retains the lion's 
share of decision-making authority, technological capability, and sourcing'. 
Importantly, however, Doherty (1994:20) adds the caveat that the specific pattern 
of regional integration and interaction will be determined by the 'interplay 
between individual corporate strategies, and home- and host-country government 
regulations and policies'. It is at this point that the potential inadequacy of a 
strategy that relies principally on market forces to determine its position in a 
regional division of labour is most starkly revealed: in contrast to Australia, other 
nations in the region are actively trying to attract Japanese investment through 
particular inducements and - perhaps most importantly - by integrating 
themselves within integrated trans-regional production networks.  
 
The importance of this interplay between economic and political initiatives can be 
illustrated in the car industry. Japanese investment  has produced a complex 
system of connected and mutually dependent production processes and supplier 
networks that span the region. Toyota, for example,  uses Thailand to supply diesel  
engines and electronics, the Philippines for transmissions, Malaysia for steering 
gears, and Indonesia for petrol engines (Kubo, 1992:32). Toyota not only gains from 
emergent local economies of scope and scale but is increasingly encouraged to 
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cement this position by host government polices. Thailand, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Indonesia have signed a brand-to-brand 'complementation pact' 
which halves the tariffs on imports from member countries (Nikkei Weekly, 1995:18; 
Machado, 1992). Clearly, this fusion of economic and political imperatives locks the 
region into a potentially  mutually rewarding symbiosis. Moreover, the 
establishment of a free trade zone within the ASEAN nations threatens to not only 
exclude outsiders from internal production networks (Kanazawa, 1995:22), but 
raises questions about the relevance and continuing importance of overarching 
bodies like APEC. 
 
From an Australian perspective, serious doubts must be raised about the 
attractiveness of that country  as a potential investment location - especially for  
manufacturers - given the emerging regional networks of production from which it 
appears to be increasingly excluded. To test this supposition it is necessary to 
consider the pattern of Japanese economic activity in Australia in  greater detail. 
 
Implications for Australia 
 
Before considering the specifics of Japanese economic involvement in Australia it is 
worth reminding ourselves of the rationale that has informed the Australian 
government's predominantly neoliberal policy framework. In essence, it is a 
paradigm that assumes that initiatives internal to Australia which enhance and 
respond to market mechanisms will encourage productive investment by countries 
like Japan.9 The government's own specialist advisory body - the East Asia 
Analytical Unit (1992:63) - provides an apposite summary: 
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The benefits of lower inflation, reductions in tariffs, increased labour market flexibility and 
lower waterfront costs will help attract investment. Further reform designed to improve the 
efficiency of Australia's economy will similarly be the most important means by which the Australian 
Government can address the underlying impediments to stronger Japanese investment in Australia's 
manufacturing sector. [Emphasis added.] 
 
Even if important questions about the continuing usefulness of a concept like 
'Australia's economy' are set aside, there are, as we have seen, reasons to question 
the efficacy of this sort of strategy.  
 
As Table 2 indicates,  investment in manufacturing by Japanese companies in 
Australia has been of less significance historically than investment in mining, 
service industries and real estate. True, in the years 1993 and 1994 there has been a 
notable improvement in the percentage  share of investment directed toward 
manufacturing, but several important caveats should be noted in this regard. 
Firstly, the total amount of Japanese investment in those years was significantly 
reduced as the demise of the 'bubble economy' in Japan caused a general reduction 
in capital outflows from Japan. Secondly, in both years, new manufacturing 
investment was concentrated almost exclusively in one area: the food industry 
(Australia-Japan Economic Institute, 1994). Furthermore, the food processing 
industry has the sort of  'tight linkages'  that mean processing must be performed 
close to the point of production (Cohen & Zysman,1987:17-9). In other words, in 
the food industry Japanese companies have little choice other than to invest in the 
country in which the raw materials are produced.  
 
While this investment may be  welcome in itself, it is important to recognise that it 
is at the  lower end of value-adding manufacturing industries, and not integrated 
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with the sorts of regional production networks that characterise the automotive 
and electronics industries for example. Overall, however, and despite a general 
restructuring of Japanese manufacturing capital into the East Asian  region in 
response to the relentless pressures of an appreciating Yen, Australia's share of 
overall Japanese investment has declined during the 1990s (JETRO, 1995: 2). There 
is no certainty, therefore, that once having obtained important strategic positions in 
agri-businesses in Australia that even such limited forms of new manufacturing 
investment will continue.10 Furthermore, it should be noted that previous Japanese 
investment in the agriculture sector has been designed to promote Japanese control 
of the industry, vertically integrating production from the farm gate to the 
supermarket shelf in Japan, with a consequent marked diminution of the share of 
profits remaining in Australia (Morrison 1993; Fowler 1996). 
 
This phenomenon is less surprising when considered in relation to Japanese 
capital's historical involvement in Australia.  Even before the Second World War, 
Australia was an important and reliable source of resources for the Japanese 
economy. The sogo shosha  established important trading linkages in Australia 
which underpinned Japan's  national resource security policy. Ultimately these 
initial connections would allow the trading houses to dominate the bilateral trade 
relationship, leaving 'Australian' exporters dependent on the sogo shosha  to 
manage the export and import of goods, even to third parties. Generally, Japanese 
investors showed little interest in Australia as a potential investment location, 
especially as far as manufacturing was concerned, until the late 1960s. 
Significantly, when Japanese investment did occur it was for much the same  
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Table 2 
Japanese Direct Investment in Australia by Sector:1983-94       
 (% share and $US millions)          
              
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Cumulative 
             1950-1994 
Manufacturing 9.03 27.6 2.8 14 20.8 8.7 3.7 9.8 13.4 10.4 37 49.7 14.6 
 15 29 13 123 254 211 159 360 342 225 712 629 3514 
              
Mining and 31.9 4.8 5.3 22.1 9.5 7.7 12.1 21 11.4 10.3 15.7 9.7 16.9 
Agricultural 53 5 25 195 116 186 516 769 291 223 302 123 4066 
              
Banking and 1.2 8.6 52.1 10.4 17 15 12.8 5.5 2.8 2.9 2 9.4 8.5 
 Insurance 2 9 244 92 208 363 545 200 72 63 38 120 2040 
              
Real Estate 1.2 5.7 12 14.4 33.6 52.6 38.1 36.4 49.2 58.6 28.1 11.3 33.5 
 2 6 56 127 411 1270 1623 1333 1255 1271 540 143 8049 
              
Commerce 53 25.7 12.4 8.7 8.9 3.8 7 8.9 8 8.6 9 4.2 8.1 
 88 27 58 77 109 92 296 326 204 187 173 54 1942 
              
Other services 3.6 29.5 15.6 30.1 10.3 12.1 26.2 18.5 15.1 9.2 8.2 15.4 18.1 
 6 31 73 265 126 292 1117 679 385 200 157    196* 4357 
              
Total 166 105 468 881 1224 2414 4256 3667 2549 2169 1922 1265 23968 
Source: Drysdale, P (1993) & Australia-Japan Economic Institute Economic Bulletin Nos 1 (6) & 3 (6).    
* Some figures unavailable            
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reasons as in the US and Europe: the desire to protect and expand market 
share (Edgington, 1990). Recent research confirms that the overwhelming 
reason Japanese manufacturers invest in Australia remains a desire to supply 
the Australian market (Nicholas, S et al, 1995). 
 
The automotive industry in Australia provides an important example of the 
rationale that underpins Japanese involvement in Australia - and an 
important test of the efficacy of government policy settings. The first point to 
recognise is that, as an important review of Australian manufacturing  put it, 
'Australia would not have a car industry without protection' (Pappas Carter 
Evans and Koop/Telesis Study,1990:189). Toyota decided to establish its first 
offshore engine plant in Australia because it wanted to maintain its position 
in a small, but lucrative market - a possibility that government policy 
otherwise constrained (Edgington,1990:143). Although  protection in 
Australia may have been crucially important in initially attracting foreign 
investment, it ultimately led to an inward-looking, uncompetitive and over-
supplied domestic market. Somewhat ironically, given the Labor 
government's general enthusiasm for market forces, a state sponsored 
industry plan was responsible for rationalising and re-orienting the car 
industry during the 1980s.  
 
What the history of vehicle production in Australia demonstrates is that 
government policy may exert a crucial influence on the investment decisions 
and production rationales of overseas-based multinationals. Indeed, given the 
huge sunk costs that are necessarily associated with car production, 
31 
government policy - or the legacy of former policies - becomes a particularly 
important determinant of future activities. It is difficult to imagine that either 
Toyota or Mitsubishi would have chosen to re-invest in Australia if it were 
not for their  extensive existing commitments. However, even where such 
investment occurs, given Australia's relatively marginal position in regional 
production networks, local operations are heavily dependent on the success 
of single models and continued supply of increasingly expensive components 
from Japan.11 Despite the extent of Japanese manufacturers existent 
investments, therefore, indefinite future commitment to Australia's small and 
crowded market cannot be assumed. This is especially the case where 
Australia's APEC commitments and concomitant move to dismantle tariff 
protection are perceived by locally-based producers to be significantly 
disadvantaging them in relation to rivals in more protected markets like 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Carruthers, 1995:40).  
 
Clearly, there is a good deal more than just the simple operation of market 
forces and the comparative efficiency of national labour forces determining 
the production strategies and investment decisions of TNCs. The strategic 
importance of the car industry in underpinning national economic capacities 
and structures means that many national governments are unwilling to rely 
on market mechanisms to determine their position in regional divisions of 
labour. Moreover, the willingness of the US to use its economic and political 
leverage to achieve measurable bilateral results in the recent  dispute over car 
parts with  Japan, further undermines the potential utility and relevance of 
the neoliberal paradigm (Beeson, 1995d). There are, however, further reasons 
for questioning the utility of a reliance on market mechanisms in determining 
economic outcomes, as the Australia-Japan case once again illustrates. 
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While the dominant neoliberal policy framework in Australia may have had 
little impact in transforming the pattern of direct investment in Australian 
manufacturing it has, however, had a significant impact in other areas. The 
most striking characteristic of Japanese investment revealed in Table 2 is the 
high level of real estate investment., especially in the late 1980s and early '90s. 
Plainly there is a direct link here with Japan's own deregulatory experience. 
In both Japan and Australia as capital became more easily available on 
international financial markets banks pursued new customers in order to 
maintain market share in the face of new forms of competition. Real estate 
developers became important targets of new lending. The consequences of 
what proved to be an unsustainable and  speculative lending boom continues 
to haunt  a Japanese banking sector plagued with mammoth and unrealisable 
debts. What is less generally recognised, however, is the impact of Japan's 
bubble economy on smaller economic partners like Australia. The disparity of 
economic size meant that individual Japanese companies had a significant 
impact on the real estate sector in Australia (Rimmer, 1993). Acting  as a 
conduit for highly mobile and speculative investors in Japan such companies 
were instrumental in fuelling a destructive bout of asset inflation and 
speculation in Australia. Even where  this investment has  provided source of 
capital for the increasingly important tourism industry in Australia, it should 
be noted that - in keeping with the Australian government's overarching 
commitment to investment liberalisation - there has been little attempt to 
evaluate the impact or control the direction of such significant investment 
inflows (Berry, 1994:192). 
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A more considered review of Japanese investment would have revealed the 
same patterns of vertical integration in the tourism industry that 
characterised the agricultural sector (Roberts 1992). The scale of Japanese 
investment in the tourism industry during the period of the bubble economy - 
it reached some $A 9 billion by 1989 (Dwyer and Forsyth 1991) - had far 
reaching impacts outside the industry itself. Firstly, when the bubble 
collapsed many Japanese investors tried to disinvest, a process made more 
difficult by the consequent deterioration in real estate values (Smith 1995). 
Perhaps of greater long term significance, however, was a resurgence of 
economic nationalism,  which while raising legitimate questions about the 
wisdom of allowing Australia’s economic sovereignty to be undermined and 
the quality of the jobs provided in industries like tourism, also fuelled a 
xenophobic response to international economic developments (David & 
Wheelwright 1989). 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the service sector in general and the banking 
sector in particular are similarly unregulated, and have generated equally 
ambiguous outcomes. While the ostensible rationale behind Labor's opening 
up of domestic  banking sector to foreign competition was  'efficiency' gains, 
there has been little obvious benefit from this process in the form of lower 
interest rates, increased availability of capital for productive investment, or 
better customer services (Hawtrey et al, 1991).  Yet such an outcome is less 
surprising when it is recognised that Japanese banks in particular  were 
principally concerned with following the logic of Japanese corporate 
organisation and servicing existing Japanese clients (Nicholas et al, 1995), 
rather than attracting new Australian business or establishing a retail 
networks. What the new banks and finance houses did do, however, was to 
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facilitate  flows of financial capital from Japan to Australia, a potentially 
significant development given that  the great majority of Japanese investment 
in Australia is in the form of portfolio, rather than direct investment. The 
sheer size of these flows means that changes that are marginal in a Japanese 
context may have significant impacts on Australia (Higgins, 1992). Moreover, 
the  leverage conferred by such disparities in economic weight and influence 
means that it is possible for Japanese institutional investors to deliberately 
engineer currency fluctuations in order to generate speculative short-term 
gains (Burrell, 1993:1). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper has considered the usefulness of Australia's neoliberal economic 
policy framework in relation to the Japanese political-economy and, more 
specifically, forms of Japan-based corporate organisation that do not 
necessarily have market mechanisms as their central organising principle. It 
should be emphasised that no judgement is being made or attempted about 
the possible 'fairness' of such commercial practices. Rather, the intention has 
been to see how well a specific policy paradigm can account for and 
accommodate distinctively different economic relationships. If the efficacy of 
competing forms of national economic management is to be judged on a 
calculus of narrow national economic advantage then there are reasons for 
questioning the appropriateness of Australia's embrace of neoliberalism. 
 
In the region of which Australia is a part market forces are clearly neither the 
sole, nor often the major determinants of economic outcomes. Both at the 
level of the firm and in the distinctive cooperative  relationships that have 
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evolved between governments and private capital  throughout East Asia, 
patterns of economic activity and the organisation of industry owe much to 
the structure of corporations and the activities of state governments keen to 
ensure they are part of emerging regional  production networks. Whether  
providing inducements to private capital is an appropriate use of taxation 
revenues is less important, in the context of this discussion, than is the 
recognition that such practices are important determinants of productive 
investment flows. Similarly, whether Japanese-style corporations are well 
advised to favour group loyalty over profitability is of less significance here 
than is the recognition that such considerations are central to any explanation 
of corporate behaviour amongst Japanese firms. As Encarnation and Mason 
(1994:441) observe, 'ownership can - and does - matter'. Certainly, there may 
be a degree of convergence occurring in the behaviour of transnational 
companies from around the globe,  but this is easily overstated; there are still 
important differences in corporate logic between those TNCs based in Anglo-
American economies and those from East Asia. True, not all the nations of 
East Asia and the companies based therein follow the 'Japanese model', but 
the distinctive patterns of economic activity associated with Chinese 
capitalism12 hardly invalidate a more general claim: policy paradigms that do 
not take account of the specificity of the distinctive commercial practices 
found in countries like Japan are unlikely to plausibly account for, much less 
respond effectively to such differences in commercial logic and behaviour. 
 
And yet despite Australia's proximity to East Asia, its public policy, 
especially in its external aspects, remains predicated upon an idealised 
depiction of free market capitalism that is generally not even observed in its 
Anglo-American strongholds. Australian policy-makers continue to place 
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great hopes in their ability to persuade other countries of the merits of more 
market-conforming public policy frameworks. Even if they are successful in 
reducing the high levels of overt tariffs and the complex array of 'invisible' 
barriers to trade this will have little impact on the distinctive patterns of 
corporate organisation that characterise the region. Similarly, persuading 
Australia's workforce to adopt more 'flexible' work practices in pursuit of 
productivity and 'efficiency' gains is unlikely to lead to Australia being 
integrated into regional patterns of production or necessarily leave 
'Australian' companies any more able to compete with Japanese rivals that 
enjoy cooperative links with other keiretsu  members and which are less 
dependent on short term profitability.13 
 
A closer reading of the specific historical trajectories of capitalist 
development within the East Asian region might  leave Australian policy-
makers better able to comprehend and respond to the varieties of regional 
commercial practices. Moreover, such a reading might also provide an 
alternative to the dominant neoliberal model. Clearly, the rapid 
transformation and industrialisation of the region to Australia's north 
provides potentially important lessons about ways to achieve economic 
development. While there may be much that is not readily applicable to a 
country like Australia with notably different political traditions, it may at 
least provide the basis for a less doctrinaire approach to policy-making. 
Without a more complex and nuanced approach to the region it seems 
unlikely that Australia will be able to maintain its present position, let alone 
take advantage of its location adjacent to the most economically dynamic 
region on the planet. 
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Footnotes 
1 The transnationalisation of economic activity, especially production, and the sorts of trade 
flows it generates, has rendered questions of nationality increasingly problematic. See 
Strange (1995) and Reich (1992). 
2 Although Australia was situated next to the most rapidly developing economic region in 
the world,  Australia's overall share of world exports declined from 2.04% in 1963 to 1.23% in 
1983 when Labor took office (Pinkstone, 1992: 377). 
3 Under the APEC trade liberalisation timetable the 'industrialised' economies are expected to 
achieve 'free and open trade' by the year 2010, and the 'developing' economies by 2020. It 
should be pointed out that this could mean that 'developing' economies like Korea might 
have free access to the US market for ten years - an unlikely prospect given the US 
protectionist sentiment in the face of continuing trade deficits. 
4 The difficulties trade liberalisation causes Japan can be seen by  its innovative solution to 
the problem of  appearing to open its rice market while simultaneously marinating the 
support of the agriculture lobby. Under a new scheme imported rice will be immediately ‘re-
exported’ to developing countries (Boyd 1996:10). 
5 It should be acknowledged, however,  that neoliberalism has not been the sole influence on 
domestic policies. Labor's traditional affiliation with a relatively powerful national union 
movement acted as an important brake on wholesale reform. Indeed, the Labor government's 
time in office has been characterised by half-hearted attempts at pursuing the sorts of 
industry policies that have been employed with  notable success by its Asian neighbours. But 
what is most striking about the reform process in Australia is the  manner in which the trade 
union movement itself has gradually been co-opted into the attempted reorganisation of 
economic activity, ultimately embracing the disciplinary logic of the 'globalization process' 
and the need to comply with the apparently irresistible imperatives of international 
economic competition (Campbell, 1993). 
6 Personal interview, John Farrel Managing Director, Oceanfast Marine Group. 
7 Australia has generally enjoyed an annual  trade surplus with Japan in excess of $US 2 
billion during the 1990s. 
8 It is worth noting that the Australian tax office is sufficiently concerned about Japanese 
corporations shifting profits offshore to have launched a special investigation into their 
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activities. (Featherstone 1995). 
9 The general structure of industry within Australia makes productive foreign investment 
especially important. Most indigenous 'Australian' TNCs are 'multi-domestic', that is, they 
do not operate in the most highly traded product areas, but generally 'export' by establishing 
plants within target markets overseas.  These sorts of  industries, like food and construction, 
do little to address Australia's balance of trade problems, especially its manufactures deficit. 
Consequently, encouraging export-oriented manufacturers to establish subsidiaries in 
Australia becomes even more imperative. See, Craig & Yetton (1994). 
10 The most recent figures available at the time of writing suggest that while Japanese 
investment rebounded from its recent low levels it has returned to a more familiar pattern. In 
the first half of 1995 42% of new investment went into real estate (Hartcher, 1996:3). 
11 Toyota's new Australian plant, for example, will be largely dedicated to producing the 
Camry model for export markets. While this may be no bad thing in itself it is questionable 
whether such a model is likely to capture a share of emergent regional markets in which auto 
makers place such hopes. Moreover, there is little possibility of boosting local R&D when the 
models are developed in Japan as part of a Tokyo-based world production strategy. 
Furthermore,  given  Australia's attraction as a potential investment location  in comparison 
with the US and Japan is seen to be lower labour costs, local operations are likely to be less 
capital intensive, and the resultant product less competitive. (Based on personal interviews 
with  Toyota Australia executives). 
12 For a useful discussion of the differences between Japanese-style and Chinese capitalism, 
see (Whitley 1991). 
13 Significantly, however, this still workplace reform still appears to be the newly-elected 
coalition government’s principal strategy for attracting Japanese investment. (Gordon 1996). 
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